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"This is an unusual case of sexual harassment -- not in that
it happened, but in that [the plaintiff] sued."1
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1998, a federal district court upheld a jury
damage award of $60,000 to a co-worker of two New York City tran-
sit employees who were sexually harassed by their supervisors.2 The
Plaintiff, Diane Leibovitz, sued the New York City Transit Authority
for sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19643 although she was never the target of the harass-
ment. Leibovitz alleged severe emotional distress after learning that a
female car cleaner accused a Deputy Superintendent of harassment
and after a third woman had been transferred upon suffering from the
same harassment.4 When Leibovitz confronted the alleged harasser
and other high-level supervisors with the situation, she was warned by
a supervisor that her complaints could be detrimental to her career5
As a result, Leibovitz suffered from depression, the inability to sleep,
weight gain, and anxiety.6 After a jury trial and defense motions for a
directed verdict and new trial, U.S. District Judge Jack Weinstein
found that Leibovitz had standing to sue under Title VII, that a hostile
work environment materially altered the conditions of her employ-
' Brief of Respondent Mechelle Vinson at 44, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979).
2 See Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp.2d 144, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1994) [hereinafter "Title VII" or "the Act"].
4 See Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp.2d at 146. Notably, most of the harassment did not occur in
front of Leibovitz; she learned of the situation after speaking with co-workers. See id. Accord-
ing to Professor Merrick T. Rossein of CUNY Law School, who represented Leibovitz:
Virtually every day... women come to her and say, 'I'm being sexually harassed,'
and she shouldn't have to put a shield around herself and ignore the fact that there is
sexual and gender-based harassment to women all around her, and that this abusive
and hostile environment impacts on her ability to do her work.
Andy Newman, Transit Manager's Sexism Suit to Be Tried, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1997, at B3.
5 See Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp.2d at 147.
6 See id. at 152.
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ment, and that she suffered mental and emotional injuries as a result
of the harassing conduct.7 This seminal decision allowing a bystander
claim of hostile environment sexual harassment is the basis for this
examination of a plaintiffs cause of action under Title VII for "by-
stander injury" caused by a hostile work environment from sexual
harassment directed at other employees. 8
As Leibovitz is the first reported case where an employee not the
target of sexual harassment has successfully sued under the hostile
environment cause of action, this Note examines both existing Title
VII theories of harassment and the Leibovitz decision. This Note first
traces the legislative history behind the prohibition against sex dis-
crimination under Title VII and the development of sexual harassment
claims under the statute. The Note then analyzes the bystander injury
cause of action against this framework to demonstrate that an em-
ployee may properly state a claim for bystander injury from hostile
environment sexual harassment. The analysis also identifies and re-
sponds to the complications in litigating this form of sexual harass-
ment. From here, the analysis shifts to suggest particular elements
that courts should require plaintiffs to prove in a bystander injury
claim, and identifies employer strategies for the prevention of by-
stander injury claims. In sum, this Note demonstrates that an em-
ployee suffering from emotional distress caused by severe or perva-
sive harassment that alters the conditions of her employment may
state a claim of bystander injury under Title VII even when she is not
the target of the harassment.9
7 See id. at 148-153.
8 The theory of bystander injury, also referred to as "vicarious" or "indirect" harassment,
is relatively novel under Title VII. Although there are a handful of cases involving third-party
claims for sexual favoritism or obscene posters, graffiti, or cartoons, this Note focuses on overt
sexual harassment of co-workers that causes similar psychological injuries to a bystander em-
ployee. For an argument focusing on one aspect of the bystander claim, male standing to sue for
female harassment, see N. Morrison Torrey, Indirect Discrimination Under Title VII: Expand-
ing Male Standing to Sue for Injuries Received as a Result of Employer Discrimination Against
Females, 64 WASH. L. REV. 365 (1989).
9 A bystander injury victim would not state a claim solely for retaliation under Title VII
because the bystander injury plaintiff does not necessarily suffer from a tangible employment
action for opposing a violation of Title VII. The Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees.., because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). Although Leibovitz alleged a violation under this section, the
court did not hold for the plaintiff based on her retaliation claims.
Although this author has used the female sex in stating the conclusion here, it should be
noted that the cause of action is also available to male plaintiffs. Despite the fact that the vast
majority of reported sexual harassment decisions involve female victims, this Note will properly
alternate between the sexes when referring to potential bystander injury plaintiffs.
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I. BACKGROUND
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that "[i]t shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to... discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" Noticeably absent,
however, is any proscription against "sexual harassment" or a "hostile
work environment." Consequently, the statute is also silent on liabil-
ity for bystander injury sexual harassment. Although Title VII does
not prohibit sexual harassment on its face, the Supreme Court first
recognized the use of sex discrimination as a basis for sexual harass-
ment litigation in 1986." The interpretive decisions by the Supreme
Court, however, make no reference to a "bystander injury" claim and
few lower courts have addressed the viability of the claim. For these
reasons, the hostile environment bystander injury theory remains a
relatively untested new product of Title VII jurisprudence.
A. The Limits of Title VII Legislative History on Sex Discrimination
The prohibition of sex discrimination under Title VII has a pro-
foundly limited legislative history which is largely due to the fact that
the term "sex" was added to the string of protected classes "at the last
minute on the floor of the House of Representatives.''1 2 There is sub-
stantial skepticism over the motive behind the amendment; shortly
after the passage of the Act, many scholars reviewing the Congres-
sional Record wrote that the addition of "sex" was a political attempt
to defeat the entire Bill.
3
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
11 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that a claim of
hostile environment sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is actionable under
Title VII).
12 Id. at 63 (citing 110 CONG. REC. H2577-84 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964)). Virginia Con-
gressman Howard Smith, Chairman of the House Rules Committee, proposed the amendment
that would add "sex" to the protected classifications. A prior attempt to amend the bill was
defeated in the Judiciary Committee. See Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American
Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J.
305, 310 (1968); Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of.1964, 51 MINN. L REV. 877, 880 (1967).
13 See, e.g., Kanowitz, supra note 12, at 311; Miller, supra note 12, at 880. Interestingly,
however, Congressman Smith asserted that:
Now, I am very serious about this amendment. It has been offered several times be-
fore, but it was offered at inappropriate places in the bill. Now, this is the appropri-
ate place for this amendment to come in. I do not think it can do any harm to this
legislation; maybe it can do some good. I think it will do some good for the minor-
ity sex.
U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYmeNT COMIM,'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND
XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcrOF 1964 3213 (1978); see also Angela Onwauchi-Willig, When Differ-
ent Means the Same: Applying a Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the
19991
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The author of the amendment, Congressman Howard Smith of
Virginia, was generally opposed to the entire Act.14  One scholar
evaluating the history of the amendment concluded that, "[i]n the
context of [the] debate and of the prevailing Congressional sentiment
when the amendment was offered, it is abundantly clear that a princi-
pal motive in introducing it was to prevent passage of the basic legis-
lation being considered by Congress, rather than solicitude for
women's employment rights. 15 There was considerable opposition
to the addition of sex to the protected classes in the bill, but most
members of Congress were not necessarily opposed to the change and
many simply asserted that it "ought to receive separate legislative
treatment." 16 Both men and women rose in opposition to the amend-
ment, most of whom were either suspicious of Congressman Smith's
motives, or were in support of legislation prohibiting sex discrimina-
tion but believed it would be proper to leave the issue for subsequent
consideration. 17
The debate in the Congressional Record offers little guidance for
interpretation, as the House Rules Committee debate on the amend-
ment lasted only two hours18 and the amendment passed in the House
by a vote of 168-133.19 The Senate debate on the entire Act lasted for
several months, yet the discussion on sex discrimination was also
very limited. This is in part because the Senate, in expediting the pas-
sage of the Act, did not challenge the addition of "sex" to the pro-
McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test, 50 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 53, 67 (1999) (asserting
that Title VII was "a ploy for defeating Title Vii's prohibition on race discrimination"). But see
Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of
Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WoMEN & L. 137, 161
(1997) (arguing that there is "overwhelming evidence" that the addition of sex to the Act was
not merely a joke, but a genuine effort to advance women's rights).
14 See Kanowitz, supra note 12, at 310-11. Congresswoman Edith Green of Oregon as-
serted her surprise and suspicion that the amendment was offered in stating that "those gentle-
men of the House who are most strong in their support of women's rights this afternoon, proba-
bly gave us the most opposition when we considered the bill which would grant equal pay for
equal work just a very few months ago." U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT CONM'N,
supra note 13, at 3221 (alluding to the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963).
15 Kanowitz, supra note 12, at 311 (citations omitted).
16 Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (citing 110 CONG. REC. H2577
(daily ed. 1964) (statement of Rep. Celler) (quoting letter from U.S. Department of Labor)).
17 Congresswoman Green, a leading proponent of the Equal Pay Act passed one year
earlier, stated that:
As much as I hope the day will come when discrimination will be ended against
women, I really and sincerely hope that this amendment will not be added to this
bill. It will clutter up the bill and it may later-very well-be used to help destroy
this section of the bill by some of those very people who today support it.
Miller, supra note 12, at 882 (quoting 110 CoNG. REc. H2581 (daily ed. Feb 8, 1964)). Miller
also points out that the ten members of Congress who voted against the amendment in commit-
tee voted for passage of the Act. See id.
I' See id.
'9 See id. at 882 n.30.
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tected classes.20 Consequently, the courts have been constrained in
using the legislative history to interpret the Act and, as a result, have
broadly construed the protections for sex discrimination.
B. The Recognition of Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, courts have
been struggling to determine what conditions give rise to sex dis-
crimination. In a landmark decision in 1986, the Supreme Court in
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson held that a "hostile environ-
ment" created by sexual harassment may constitute sex discrimination
under Title VII.21  The Court recognized the theories of "quid pro
quo" and "hostile environment" harassment espoused by scholars and
women's rights groups. 22  Relying on lower court and Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") findings that sexual
harassment has the effect of discriminating against women in em-
ployment, the Court stated that, "[f]or sexual harassment to be action-
able, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the condi-
tions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment. '
This broad reading of Title VII can also be seen in subsequent
Supreme Court decisions clarifying the sexual harassment cause of
action. In 1993, the Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., affirmed
the reasoning in Meritor while facing the narrow question of whether
a plaintiff alleging sexual harassment must suffer from serious psy-
chological injury to state a claim under Title VII.24 In holding that a
20 See id. at 882-83.
21 477 U.S. 57,73 (1986).
22 See, e.g., Brief of the Women's Bar Association of the State of New York as Amicus
Curiae at 3, Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979); Brief Ami-
cus Curiae of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, et. al. at 4, Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979); Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, The Coal Employment Project, The Coalition of Labor Union Women
and the National Education Assocation as Amici Curiae at 19, Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979). For a discussion of the contributions of women's rights
advocates to judicial recognition of sexual harassment as sex discrimination, see Katherine M.
Franke, 1Wat's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1997) (dis-
cussing the contributions of Susan Estrich and Catherine MacKinnon).
23 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1lth
Cir. 1982)). The Court also draws on reasoning from the Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). See id. at 67. The Rogers court
stated that:
[Tihe phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" ... is an expansive
concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working
environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination .... One can
readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to
destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group
workers.
454 F.2d at 238.
24 510 U.S. 17,20 (1993).
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plaintiff-employee need not suffer severe emotional or psychological
injury, the court reasoned that a plaintiff who has suffered distress or
an adverse employment action may state a claim if the conduct was
objectively severe or pervasive, and the victim subjectively perceived
the environment to be abusive.25  This determination requires courts
to look at the totality of the circumstances giving rise to the claim.
Moreover, the Court reiterated the finding in Meritor that "'[t]he
phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a
congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women' in employment,' which includes re-
quiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive envi-
ronment. ' 27
During the 1998 term, the Supreme Court handed down three
sexual harassment decisions that create new procedures to resolve the
differing Circuit Court approaches to employer liability for sexual
harassment by supervisory personnel. 28 These decisions shed light on
the interpretation of harassment claims under Title VII.
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Court held that "[ain
employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with imme-
diate (or successively higher) authority over the employee."29 Fur-
thermore, to incorporate the goals of Title VII and EEOC policy-
preventing discrimination, promoting conciliation, and encouraging
the development of grievance procedures-the court also held that
when no tangible employment action has been taken against the
victim, the employer has an affirmative defense to liability or
damages.30 The affirmative defense consists of two elements which
must be shown by must be shown by the employer: "(a) that the
25 See id. at 21-22.
26 See id. at 23. The Court clarified this point, stating that determining factors may in-
clude:
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasona-
bly interferes with an employee's work performance. The effect on the employee's
psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff
actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any
other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required.
Id.
27 Id. at21 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't. of water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,707 n.13 (1978) (some internal quotation marks omitted)).
28 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
29 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Presumably, in the case of non-supervisory harassment, em-
ployer liability is determined by the "knew or should have known" standard. See 29 C.F.R. §
1604.1 l(d) (1998) (establishing a negligence standard for co-worker to co-worker harassment).
30 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. The affirmative defense is not available "when the super-
visor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or
undesirable reassignment." Id.
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must be shown by the employer: "(a) that the employer exercised rea-
sonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities pro-
vided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.",31 If both ele-
ments of the affirmative defense are not shown, however, the em-
ployer may then be held vicariously liable for the actions of a super-
visor.32 An example of this defense was seen in Faragher v. Boca
Raton, where the Court held that the city's failure to disseminate its
sexual harassment grievance procedures constituted a lack of reason-
able care to prevent harassing conduct.33 The City of Boca Raton,
therefore, was not able to successfully invoke the affirmative de-
fense.34
In the third Title VII decision of 1998, the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that
Title VII does not extend to "same-sex" harassment.35 The Court, in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., stated that if a plaintiff
can show harassment was directed at his gender to which members of
the other gender were not affected, a Title VII claim is available even
if the harasser was the same sex as the victim.36 The Court began its
analysis by stating that same-sex harassment "was assuredly not the
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title
VII.' 37 Notwithstanding this finding, the Court reasoned that:
statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits
"discrimination ... because of... sex" in the "terms" or
"conditions" of employment. Our holding that this includes
sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any
kind that meets the statutory requirements.
3 8
The Court also emphasized the importance of the context of harass-
ment, asserting that "[t]he real social impact of workplace behavior
3 1 u
32 See id.
33 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804-06.
3 See id. at 805-08.
35 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998).
36 See id. at 79. While same-sex harassment is often construed as "homosexual" harass-
ment, the Court cautioned that sexual attraction is not the only basis for sexual harassment; a
heterosexual harasser could be targeting members of his own gender because of general hostility
toward men. See hi at 79-8 1.
37 M at 79.
38 Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, ex-
pectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.,
39
C. EEOC Recognition of Bystander Injury Under Title VII
Title VII requires the EEOC to both develop guidelines for the
investigation and conciliation of allegations of Title VII violations
and to prosecute discrimination claims on behalf of the government.4°
While the EEOC Guidelines are not controlling in federal courts, they
are often regarded as highly persuasive when determining policies
and procedures for handling Title VII claims.4' Current EEOC
guidelines state that "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sex-
ual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute sexual harassment when.., such conduct has the purpose
or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work per-
formance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment."
42
The EEOC recognizes the theory of bystander injury under Title
VII, including those cases involving sexual harassment claims. The
agency has concluded that sexual harassment occurs under many dif-
ferent circumstances, and that "[t]he victim does not have to be the
person harassed but could be anyone affected by the offensive con-
duct. '43  Moreover, this policy is consistent with the EEOC policy
statement on liability for "sexual favoritism," a theory that also has
been recognized under Title VII.44 The EEOC has determined that
3 Id. at 81-82.
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a) (1994).
41 See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) ("[These guidelines,
'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of expe-
rience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.')
(quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (citation omitted)).
42 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998). The guidelines also track the Supreme Court's re-
quirements in Harris in stating that "[in determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual
harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circum-
stances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred.' 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b) (1998).
43 EEOC, Facts About Sexual Harassment (last modified Jan. 15, 1997)
<http:lwww.eeoc.gov/factslfs-sex.html> (emphasis added).
44 See Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D. D.C. 1988) (holding that prefer-
ential treatment to those who submitted to a supervisor's sexual advances may constitute hostile
environment to other employees); see also EEOC: Policy Guide on Employer Liability for Sex-
ual Favoritism Under Title VII, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 694, 405:6817, 405:6819 (Jan 12,
1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guide] (explaining that "sexual favoritism" might form a basis
for implicit "quid pro quo" sexual harassment by "communicat[ing] a message that the way for
a woman to get ahead in the workplace is by engaging in sexual conduct or that sexual solicita-
tions are a prerequisite to their fair treatment"); Marian C. Haney, Litigation of a Sexual Har-
assment Case After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 1041 (1993)
(outlining sexual favoritism claims under Title VI1).
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widespread favoritism in the workplace may constitute hostile envi-
ronment harassment and considers this conduct to be sex discrimina-
tion. The standing EEOC policy states that:
If favoritism based upon the granting of sexual favors is
widespread in a workplace, both male and female colleagues
who do not welcome this conduct can establish a hostile
work environment in violation of Title VII regardless of
whether any objectionable conduct is directed at them and
regardless of whether those who were granted favorable
treatment willingly bestowed the sexual favors.45
This policy reflects the EEOC's determination that sexual favoritism
in the workplace can give rise to hostile environment claims for
"[b]oth men and women who find this offensive.A46
D. The Emergence of "Bystander Injury" in Title VII Case Law
Amid the litany of sexual harassment claims and the EEOC's
determination that bystander injury is actionable under the Act, the
Supreme Court has never considered whether an employee may state
a bystander injury claim under Title VII. The claim in Leibovitz v.
New York City Transit Authority demonstrates that litigators are be-
ginning to explore this fairly uncharted territory of bystander injury
claims.
The Leibovitz court incorporated a three-step analysis for the by-
stander theory. The court was concerned with determining (a)
whether the plaintiff was an "aggrieved party" under the law; (b)
whether the plaintiff suffered injury to support a damage award; and
(c) the extent of employer liability.47 The court looked to the en-
forcement provisions of Title VII and the injuries Leibovitz allegedly
suffered from the hostile work environment to determine that she met
both the standing requirements and the substantive elements required
by the statute.48 Furthermore, in upholding the Transit Authority's
45 EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 44, at 405:6819. Notably, these guidelines were issued
under then-Chairman Clarence Thomas.
46 Id. at 405:6820; see also BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KAiUE, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 212 (1992) (stating that men and women who object to an
"'atmosphere demeaning to women' can establish a violation if the conduct is sufficiently...
pervasive to alter the conditions of their employment").
47 Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp.2d 144, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(examining whether emotional distress caused by the harassment of other women was enough to
support a claim for hostile work environment).
48 See id. at 148-53. The court approached the damages award pursuant to New York law,
finding that Plaintiff's testimony about the resulting depression, sleeplessness, and anxiety, as
well as the corroborating testimony of an expert witness psychiatrist, supported the award,
which was found not to be excessive under federal or state law. See id. at 153. The court relied
1999]
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liability in the case, the court stated that "the jury could find that the
Authority's procedures for preventing harassment and for dealing
with existing harassment were not reasonable. ' 49 As this decision
was handed down prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Ellerth, the
court did not use the "tangible employment action" and affirmative
defense analysis from that case.
50
In support of its reasoning, the Leibovitz court relied upon case
law that suggests support for a bystander injury theory. The court
found that "[d]icta from other circuits support a broad prohibition of
hostile work environments encompassing gender harassment that de-
grades the workplace, regardless of its initial direct targets.' In fact,
only a few courts have wrestled with the concept of bystander injury
and whether such claims should be recognized under Title VII.
The strongest support for a bystander injury claim is found in
Vinson v. Taylor, where the D.C. Circuit stated that "[e]ven a woman
who was never herself the object of harassment might have a Title
VII claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere in which such
harassment was pervasive. ' 52 The significance of the dictum in this
case is readily apparent: on appeal with a new case name, the Su-
preme Court in Meritor affirmed the D.C. Circuit's reversal of the
trial court's narrow view of what constitutes sex discrimination under
Title VII.53 The Meritor court did not make mention of the dictum,
but instead affirmed the D.C. Circuit's ruling that the district court
failed to consider the hostile environment theory, and further empha-
on the "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" standard in applying
the state law controlling the review of jury awards. Id at 153 (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Hu-
manities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996)).
49 Id. at 154.
so See generally Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Applying the rule in
Ellerth, however, the Transit Authority would have the affirmative defense available because
Leibovitz did not suffer from a tangible employment action. Although Judge Weinstein was not
able to apply the rule subsequently announced in the Ellerth decision, his opinion essentially
incorporates the affirmative defense analysis in concluding that the "jury could find that the
Authority's procedures for preventing harassment and for dealing with existing harassment were
not reasonable," Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp.2d at 154, which mirrors the "reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior" requirement in Ellerth. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 765. Because this prong of the Ellerth defense was not shown, the affirmative defense would
not have absolved the Transit Authority of vicarious liability and the conclusion in Leibovitz
would not be affected.
5' Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp.2d at 151 (citations omitted). However, it is important to note that
all of these cases involved a plaintiff who had been the target of sexual harassment. At issue in
most of these cases was the determination of what evidence was relevant to show the existence
of a hostile work environment in which the plaintiff was a direct target of harassing conduct.
52 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd sub nor. on other grounds, Meritor Say.
Bank, FSB. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The court also cited to EEOC Decision No. 71-909,
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 269-70, which states that habitual racial insults against blacks
creating a hostile working environment is a violation of white employees' rights under Title VIL
ld. at n.41.
53 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63.
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sized that "[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the
alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.'
5 4
The remaining cases cited by Leibovitz were primarily concerned
with the type of evidence that may properly be considered in deter-
mining what constitutes a hostile work environment.55 As in Meritor,
the plaintiff in these cases was the target of the harassment. In Hall v.
Gus Constr. Co., three women working as traffic controllers at a road
construction site claimed hostile environment sexual harassment.
56
The Eighth Circuit stated that Congress' "intention [was] to define
discrimination in the broadest possible terms," and that "evidence of
sexual harassment directed at employees other than the plaintiff is
relevant to show a hostile work environment. ' 57  Additionally, the
Tenth Circuit emphasized in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co. that "one of
the critical inquiries in a hostile environment claim must be the envi-
ronment."58 Several federal district courts confronted with the evi-
dentiary question have also employed the same reasoning as the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits.59
Outside of the federal courts, a California appeals court recog-
nized the possibility of a bystander injury claim.60 In Fisher v. San
Pedro Peninsula Hosp., the court found that although a bystander-
4 Id at68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
55 The Leibovitz court also cited to Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth
Cir. 1982), where the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "a hostile or offensive atmosphere created
by sexual harassment can, standing alone, constitute a violation of Title VII." The context of
this dictum was the court's holding that a plaintiff need not show a tangible job detriment to
state a claim under Title VIL See icL
" 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988). In this case, two of the three women were subjected to
derogatory comments, "mooning," sexual propositions, and offensive physical contact by their
male co-workers. See id. at 1011-12. The third woman was subjected to offensive incidents
such as mooning, lewd comments, and men urinating in the gas tank of her car. See id.
'7Id. at 1014-15.
'8 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original). But see Jones v. Flagship
Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that sexually harassing incidents reported by
other employees is relevant only if the incidents affect the psychological well-being of the
plaintiff).
59 See, e.g., Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("The requirement
that the sexual harassment be pervasive both permits and may require the introduction of evi-
dence of Tolin's similar harassment of other women."); Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n,
766 F. Supp. 1052, 1074 (M.D. Ala. 1990) ("Mhe court has not limited its perspective and
assessment to the effect of the harassment on the intended individuals, that is, the persons at
whom it has been directed. A person may be a victim of sexual harassment without being its
intended victim; the challenged conduct need not be directed at the complaining individual.")
(citing Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 1989)); Shrout v. Black Clawson
Co., 689 F. Supp. 774, 776 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that evidence of other sexual harassment
in company is admissible to show hostile environment); EEOC v. Gumee Inn Corp., 48 FEP
Cases 871 (N.D. IIl. 1988) ("Observance of sexual harassment of others can, and in this case I
conclude did, create a 'hostile working environment.'); Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460,
468 (E.D. Va. 1987) (stating that evidence that a male perpetrator harassed women other than
plaintiff is useful in establishing a hostile work environment).
6o Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 852-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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type claim may be available, it would require a higher showing
than a claim for direct harassment. In holding that the plaintiff did
not state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment, the court
intimated that an employee could bring a bystander harassment claim
if one could show that they "personally witnessed the harassing con-
duct and that it was in [the] immediate work environment.1
61
E. A Rejection of Third Party, or "Associational," Claims
Courts have rejected hostile environment claims that have been
labeled "associational" injury under Title VII. 62 In Childress v. City
of Richmond, the Fourth Circuit en banc affirmed a district court rul-
ing that white male police officers did not have standing to bring an
action for discrimination against female and black officers by the of-
ficers' supervisor.63 The court rejected the notion that a "breakdown
of esprit de corps that results from working in a racially or sexually
polarized environment" was sufficient injury to invoke jurisdiction
under Title VII.64 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has rendered two
decisions rejecting third-party claims. In Drake v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg., the court held that white employees did not show evidence of
a hostile work environment or race discrimination as a result of their
injured association with black co-workers subjected to race discrimi-
nation.65 Similarly, in Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., a white fe-
male manager at an em ent agency sued the company for race
and sex discrimination. Although she was not the target of race or
sex discrimination, she charged that her co-workers and the company
engaged in discriminatory practices such as searching for white can-
didates for placement with certain clients.67 The court rejected her
Title VII claims, holding that she was not the target of discrimination
61 Id. at 853; see also infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the California Court of Appeals' deci-
sions in Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), and
Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).
62 See, e.g., Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp.2d 144, 151 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (distinguishing a case where association with mistreated co-workers did not in and of
itself establish a hostile work environment).
63 134 F.3d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1998).
64 Id. at 1208.
65 134 F.3d 878, 884-85 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that recovery for hostile work environ-
ment harassment under Title VII requires the plaintiff to establish that he or she was subjected
to a hostile work environment because of his or her membership in a protected class).
6 138 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1998).
67 See id. at 1180. The plaintiff alleged that one co-worker bragged over receiving gifts
from an employer for whom she accommodated his preferences for white-only candidates and
that another employee commented that he didn't want to send his son to school in Minneapolis
because the people were "faggots" and feared that his son "would come home wearing dresses."
Id.
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and did not suffer from sex discrimination. Judge Easterbrook, writ-
ing for the court, stated that:
[The plaintiff] is not entitled to enforce [the candidate's]
rights and does not claim that she was retaliated against for
sticking up for the rights of black co-workers or clients. Her
claim is not that white women were harassed on account of
their race or sex, but that persons of any race or sex who
were opposed to discrimination felt uncomfortable. We have
never recognized this as a valid theory of discrimination un-
der Title VII.68
Similarly, a Magistrate Judge in Kansas rejected the proposed
joinder of a male plaintiff in a hostile work environment action
brought by female co-workers. The judge ruled that "[the plaintiff
must] show that he belongs to a protected group; he was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment; and such harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment."69 The judge added that the
plaintiff "[iun piggyback fashion . . . would add a sort of bystander
tort action to the statutory discrimination claims of others. The court
finds no acceptable rationale for finding this kind of claim to be con-
templated by Title VII.
' 70
Although some courts remain uncertain as to the merits of the
bystander theory, it is readily apparent from the Supreme Court sex-
ual harassment cases and their progeny-as well as from the EEOC
guidelines-that there is considerable support for a Title VII by-
stander injury claim. With little guidance from the Supreme Court or
the Circuit Courts of Appeal, litigators are faced with the prospect of
shaping the future of Title VII sexual harassment law.
II. BYSTANDER INJURY: A "PRISTINE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT"
CLAIM
71
Like a toxin released into a ventilation system, sexual harass-
ment can poison the entire workplace environment. Clean lines can-
not be drawn between the targets of harassment and those who ob-
6s ld. (citations omitted).
69 Ramirez v. Bravo's Holding Co., 67 FEP Cases 733, 734 (D. Kan. 1995) (emphasis
added).
7o Id. at 735. But see Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1074
(M.D. Ala. 1990) (finding that victims of sexual harassment targeted at women "include those
male [employees] who harbor a respect and concern for all their fellow [employees], irrespec-
tive of their sex, and who find offensive to their conscience, and thus intolerable, an environ-
ment in which all [employees], regardless as to their sex, cannot share equally in the opportuni-
ties of employment").
71 Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp.2d 144, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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serve the physical and emotional abuse. This Note concludes that
courts should recognize a bystander injury claim for sexual harass-
ment and will show: (1) that Title VII must be read to protect em-
ployees not the target of words and actions that discriminate against
other employees in the terms or conditions of their employment; (2)
the elements a plaintiff must prove in a claim of bystander injury; and
(3) how employers may prevent bystander injury harassment and liti-
gation.
A. Bystander Injury Is Actionable Under Title VII
In concluding that the bystander injury sexual harassment claim
is actionable under Title VII, this analysis will point to support from
the legislative history behind the enactment of Title VII, Supreme
Court cases interpreting the Act, EEOC guidelines, and the existence
of other forms of indirect hostile environment sex discrimination.
1. The Legislative History of Title VII Supports the Bystander
Injury Claim
As shown in Part I.A., the limited legislative history behind the
inclusion of "sex" in Title VII provides little to no insight into the
scope of the protections against sex discrimination. 72 The question
then remains: To what extent did Congress intend to protect employ-
ees from discrimination based on their gender? One might conclude
that because Congress so hastily added sex to the list of protected
classifications (and perhaps only as a political blunder), courts should
construe the protection as narrowly as possible.73 More persuasive,
72 See Miller, supra note 12, at 882-83 (stating that "legislative history is little help to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in administering that part of Title VII forbidding
sex discrimination").
73 While it is beyond the scope of this writing to discuss the virtues and failings of utiliz-
ing congressional intent to develop Title VII jurisprudence, there is little merit to this argument.
If one were to base the analysis on the allegedly malevolent intent of the amendment's sponsor,
the conclusion would be that the prohibition of sex discrimination should not even be recog-
nized, for the "intene' was to defeat the entire bill and not to extend protection against gender
discrimination.
Although this conclusion may seem perfectly consistent, it should be remembered that
"[i]t is easy enough to discover expressions of the views of Congress's subgroups and factions;
it is far more difficult to discern the will of Congress as a collective body." Roger H. Davidson,
What Judges Ought to Know About Lawmaking in Congress, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TowARD INS'rrrTIONAL CoMTY 90, 115 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988). That Congress was
unable to resolve differences between members leaves the courts to properly determine the will
of the Congress, not the motivations of those who author ambiguous or contradictory language.
See id.
For a collection of arguments on the function and propriety of legislative history, see
Robert A. Katzmann, Summary of Proceedings, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD
INSTITUTIONAL COMrY 170-75 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (basing his arguments on a
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however, is the conclusion that it should be construed at least as
broadly as the other enumerated classifications. One scholar writing
on the inclusion of sex into the bill concluded that:
[When Congress adopts any legislation, especially a law
with such important ramifications, one must infer a Congres-
sional intention that such legislation be effective to carry out
its underlying social policy-which in this case is to eradi-
cate every instance of sex-based employment discrimination
that is not founded upon a bona fide occupational qualifica-tion. 74
There is also general agreement that, although the motives for in-
cluding sex in Title VII are clearly mixed, there is subsequent evi-
dence that Congress intended to provide as much protection against
sex discrimination as the other enumerated classifications.75 For ex-
ample, the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 clearly demonstrates
that Congress intended to address the disparity between men and
women in the workplace, and shows a general intent to eradicate dis-
crimination based on sex.76 Thus, while specific intent may not be
available in the legislative history of Title VII, these considerations
lead to the conclusion that the proscription against sex discrimination
should be given full effect in the courts. Although not intended to
sanitize the working environment from "genuine but innocuous dif-
ferences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members
of the same sex and of the opposite sex," Title VII was designed to rid
the workplace of "behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the
'conditions' of the victim's employment.' 77
2. The Supreme Court Broadly Construes the Language of Title VII
Although the legislative history is not conclusive on the scope of
protections against sex discrimination, the Supreme Court consis-
colloquium including Justice Antonin Scalia, then-First Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer, Rep.
Robert W. Kastenmeier, Judge Abner J. Mikva, and others).
74 Kanowitz, supra note 12, at 312.
75 See Kanowitz, supra note 12, at 311-12; Miller, supra note 12, at 884-85.
76 See Miller, supra note 12, at 885 ("Accordingly, it would be a mistake to place too
much emphasis on the particular circumstances in which the ban on sex discrimination was
passed.").
77 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). There is, of course,
considerable scholarship suggesting an expansion of what constitutes sexual harassment and the
type of conduct that falls under the purview of Title VII. For a comprehensive review of the
existing sexual harassment paradigm and the scope of Title VII, see generally Vicky Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
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tently interprets the language in Title VII broadly. 8 In the context of
sexual harassment, the Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
opened the door to expanding the range of conduct falling within the
scope of Title VII. 79  The Harris Court affirmed the finding in Meri-
tor that "[t]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment'
evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of dis-
parate treatment of men and women' in employment,' which includes
requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive envi-
ronment." ° Most notably, the Harris court cast the potential victims
of sexual harassment as "people" in the work environment and estab-
lishes no specific requirement that plaintiffs be the intended victims
of the harassing conduct.8 In fact, Title VII is not even limited to
actual employees; the Act extends protections to non-employees such
as job applicants and union members. 82
In the 1998 term, the Court provided perhaps the most revealing
insight into the scope of sexual harassment under Title VII. Although
the narrow holding in Oncale was based on a claim of same-sex har-
assment, the Court's analysis stated that same-sex harassment "was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it
enacted Title VUI.",83  Notwithstanding this finding, the Court rea-
soned that "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil
to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provi-
sions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators
by which we are governed." 84 As this Note will later delineate," the
basis for the bystander injury claim can be viewed as a variation of
79 Prior to the Meitor decision, the Supreme Court had taken many opportunities to liber-
ally construe the language in Title VIL See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
763 (1976) ("Congress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequal-
ity in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin ...."); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (finding that Con-
gress' purposes were focused on "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification").
79 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
8o Id. at 21 (citing Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting
Los Angeles Dep't. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (some inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
S See id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment
to which members of the other sex are not exposed."); see also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S.
54, 77 (1984) (stating that "the dominant purpose of [Title VII] ... is to root out discrimination
in employment").
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1998) (prohibiting discrimination by potential employ-
ers); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (prohibiting discrimination by labor organizations); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(b) (prohibiting discrimination by employment agencies).
'3 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
84 Id. (emphasis added).
a' See infra Part J3.
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the hostile work environment claim. Because bystander injury is a
product of a hostile work environment and a comparable evil to the
terms and conditions of employment, it is consistent to recognize a
bystander injury claim under the logic in Oncale.
The Oncale decision also reminds that "Title VII prohibits "dis-
criminat[ion] ... because of... sex" in the "terms" or "conditions" of
employment." 86 The Court, however, appears to extend the scope of
the hostile environment theory by stating that: "Our holding [in
Meritor] that this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual
harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.'87 The
Court was, of course, addressing the issue of sexual harassment in-
volving members of the same sex. Yet according to the broad and
inclusive language of the Oncale decision, if a plaintiff can meet the
requirements set forth in Title VII, sexual harassment directed toward
other employees may be actionable as a bystander injury claim if the
plaintiff can show discrimination "because of... sex."8 8 The Oncale
decision also reaffirms the Meritor and Harris requirements that for
hostile environment harassment to be actionable, the plaintiff must
prove that the harassment was unwelcome and severe or pervasive.8 9
Therefore, Oncale strongly supports the conclusion that a bystander
plaintiff who can show injury from a hostile work environment that is
both unwelcome and objectively severe or pervasive may state a
claim under Title VII.
3. Bystander Injury is Embodied in Traditional Hostile Environment
Theory
a. Hostile Environment Case Law
Although Leibovitz was the first reported decision finding that an
employee who was not the target of sexual harassment could state a
claim under Title VII, it is important to note that the bystander injury
theory is not necessarily a new creation. The theory, to a limited ex-
tent, was first recognized in 1971 in a Title VII ethnic discrimination
case. The Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. EEOC stated that if employers
segregate customers and only allow employees to assist customers of
a certain ethnic origin, an employee would be "aggrieved" under the
language in Title VII although the employee is not the direct target of
the discriminatory animus. 90 In Rogers, the defendants argued that
86 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1998)).
87 U (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1994).
s See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78.
90 454 F.2d 234,237 (5th Cir. 1971).
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because their discriminatory actions were directed at customers and
not employees, the employee could not state a claim under Title VII. 9'
In rejecting this argument, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.92 In
Griggs, the Court held that an employer may be liable under Title VII
even if no discriminatory intent motivated a particular company pol-
icy and the policy resulted in a disparate impact upon the protected
class of employees. 93 The Fifth Circuit interpreted the Griggs holding
to stand for the principle that "the thrust of Title VIl's proscriptions is
aimed at the consequences or effects of an employment practice and
not at the employer's motivation."
94
The Supreme Court in Meritor later embraced the Fifth Circuit's
logic. The Court, in recognizing a claim for sex discrimination from
workplace sexual harassment, quoted the broad language in Rogers
that "'[o]ne can readily envision working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional
and psychological stability of minority group workers."'95 The Court
joined the lower courts in recognizing that discriminatory conduct can
reach groups of people and not simply individual targets of the ani-
mus.
Given this history, the Leibovitz decision finds its roots in tradi-
tional hostile environment theory. Judge Weinstein first queried
whether the law denies
that an environment where a superior refers to co-workers in
vulgar sexual terms, while studiously avoiding calling one
favored female profane names, is demeaning, harassing, and
incompatible with the dignity and well-being of all the
women in that workplace? Benign neglect by an employer
under such circumstances is not permitted.96
The court then reasoned that an employee, who is not the target of
sexual harassment in the workplace, may obtain damages from hostile
environment sex discrimination because Title VII and its case law
"affords 'employees the right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.' ' 97 Accordingly, the
"' See id. at 238.
92 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
" See id. at 431-32.
94 Rogers, 454 F.2d at 239.
95 Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,66 (1986) (quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d at
238) (emphasis added)).
96 Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp.2d. 144, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
97 Id. at 152 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65). To further illustrate, the court drew upon the
analogy of the "rare Jewish person in a Nazi concentration camp afforded privileged treatment
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Leibovitz court relied on Rogers and Meritor analysis as preliminary
support for the bystander injury claim in sexual harassment.98
b. The Distinction Between Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment
The Leibovitz decision asserted that Title VII case law suggests
that "[p]ersonal harassment is not the gravamen of a hostile work en-
vironment claim."99 In support, the Leibovitz court reasoned that if
employees indirectly subjected to an hostile work environment were
disallowed from stating a claim under Title VII, the Supreme Court's
distinction between "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" claims
would be rendered virtually meaningless. 1°° In other words, to deny
a claim for bystander injury would so narrowly construe the hostile
environment claim as to make it virtually indistinguishable from a
"quid pro quo" claim, where an employee is targeted by a supervisor
to exchange sexual contact or flirtation for a promotion or continued
employment. Because quid pro quo harassment by definition in-
volves a targeted employee, the law implicitly requires that a quid pro
quo plaintiff must be a targeted victim.'0 ' In a hostile environment
action, however, the plaintiff is not required to show that she is a tar-
geted victim. 02 Thus, a rejection of the bystander injury claim would
eliminate this important distinction between the two theories.
The Supreme Court recently commented on the distinctions be-
tween quid pro quo and hostile environment in the Ellerth decision.
The Court stated that sexual harassment which has not culminated in
a tangible employment action should be regarded as a hostile work
environment claim. 0 3 The Ellerth Court stated that "[t]he terms quid
while other Jews were being horribly persecuted." Id. Just as the law would recognize a claim
for the trauma of witnessing the abuse, Judge Weinstein reasoned that Title VII allows an em-
ployee to obtain relief for the discriminatory actions of supervisors against their co-workers. See
id.
" See id. at 150.
99 Id.
'00 See id.
101 When making a distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment, it is obvious
that in order to claim the former, the plaintiff must prove that he or she was the victim of such
conduct. It is not possible to be subjected to quid pro quo harassment without being the targeted
victim.
102 See infra Part 1.A.3.
10-' See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). The Court commented
further on the distinction:
When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to
submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that the employment
decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employment that is
actionable under Title VII. For any sexual harassment preceding the employment
decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive. Be-
cause Ellerth's claim involves only unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a
hostile work environment claim which requires a showing of severe or pervasive
conduct.
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pro quo and hostile work environment are helpful, perhaps, in making
a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out
and those where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this
are of limited utility." 1°4 Although the Court downplays the signifi-
cance of the labels for determining employer liability, the Court did
not intend to eliminate the distinctions between the two theories. The
Court explained its position by writing that:
The principal significance of the distinction is to instruct that
Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive altera-
tions in the terms or conditions of employment and to explain
[that the hostile environment] must be severe or pervasive.
The distinction was not discussed for its bearing upon an em-
ployer's liability for an employee's discrimination.
Thus, it is apparent that the Court was not intimating that the dis-
tinctions are no longer relevant. Instead, the Court was clarifying its
earlier decisions by explaining that the theories of sexual harassment
were constructed to outline the framework for sexual harassment liti-
gation and not for the determination of liability. Consequently, it is
clear that the distinction between the actions in a quid pro quo and a
hostile environment claim is still intact for the purposes of analyzing
a potential claim such as bystander injury harassment. A rejection of
the bystander injury theory will destroy the "rough demarcation" that
exists between targeted employees stating a quid pro quo claim and
employees who have suffered from a hostile environment.1°6
The fact that there is a significant distinction between a quid pro
quo and hostile environment claim is not dispositive in determining
whether courts should recognize the bystander injury claim. Al-
though the Supreme Court has only reviewed cases where the plaintiff
was directly involved in the hostile environment harassment, it is im-
portant to note that a plaintiff has never been required to prove that he
or she was the intended target of the hostile environment harassment.
Il
'04 Id. at 751.
105 Id. Furthermore, the Court made it clear that the distinctions are to be maintained in
sexual harassment litigation:
We do not suggest the terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are irrele-
vant to Title VII litigation. To the extent they illustrate the distinction between cases
involving a threat which is carried out and offensive conduct in general, the terms
are relevant when there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove dis-
crimination in violation of Title VII.
Id. at 753.
"6 See id. at 751 (stating that "[tihe terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are
helpful... in making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and
those where they are not or are absent altogether").
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To state a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment under Title
VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the conduct was unwelcome;107 (2)
the conduct was subjectively unreasonable and so severe or pervasive
as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work
environment; 08 and (3) that the discrimination was because of sex.' °9
Thus, the long-standing absence of a requirement that a plaintiff must
prove she was an intended victim strongly suggests that an employee
who is not the intended target of unwelcome severe or pervasive har-
assment is not barred from stating a claim under Title VII.11
4. Indirect Sex Discrimination Cases Support the Bystander Injury
Theory
Additional support for the bystander injury claim consists of the
two related lines of case law recognizing sexual favoritism and ob-
scene picture discrimination. These cases focus on injuries suffered
by employees who were not necessarily the target of sexually explicit
conduct, yet suffer from a hostile work environment that affects the
terms or conditions of their employment.
Courts finding that widespread and open favoritism given to em-
ployees who submit to fondling, sexual horseplay, crude jokes, and
even sexual intercourse acknowledge that a hostile environment may
injure those employees who were either not targeted by this behavior
or who have not positively responded to the harassment.1
107 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17,21-22 (1993).
' See id., 510 U.S. at 21; Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,67 (1986).
1o9 See Harris, at 21; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67; see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
110 Interestingly, Oncale makes a seemingly innocuous reference to a particular victim of
hostile environment harassment. The Court stated that "[i]n same-sex (as in all) harassment
cases, [the reasonable person] inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context in
which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target." 523 U.S. at 81 (emphasis
added). Because this is the first and only instance where the Court makes a reference to a tar-
geted victim, the Court was assuredly not intending to forestall a bystander injury claim.
11 See, e.g., Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D. D.C. 1988) (stating that
"'[e]ven a woman who was never herself the object of harassment might have a Title VII claim
if she were forced to work in an atmosphere in which such harassment was pervasive') (quot-
ing Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp.,
904 F.2d 853, 860-62 (3d Cir. 1990) (indicating in dictum that a consensual sexual relationship
may result in a hostile work environment for a third party); Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571,
581 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that a consensual sexual relationship in workplace can create a
hostile work environment); see also Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 832
(1991) ("[lIt is very difficult to argue that the underlying bargain - sex for ajob or promotion -
is worthy of protection, or does not constitute sex-based discrimination, when viewed one step
away.").
Courts have rejected claims of sexual favoritism that do not involve the more egregious
conduct seen in Broderick, discussed supra at notes 108-11 and accompanying text. See, e.g.,
DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 302 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting Title
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In Broderick v. Ruder, a leading sexual favoritism case, the fe-
male plaintiff alleged that her work environment was tainted by an
atmosphere of pervasive sexual harassment as a result of "sexual fa-
voritism."' 12 Although the plaintiff was not directly faced with a quid
pro quo situation, the conduct of her supervisors toward other women
conveyed the impression that only those women who submitted to the
sexual innuendoes and flirtations were promoted. The court held that
"consensual sexual relations, in exchange for tangible employment
benefits, while possibly not creating a cause of action for the recipient
of such sexual advances who does not find them unwelcome, do, and
in this case did, create and contribute to a sexually hostile working
environment."'"13 Furthermore, the court stated that:
[I]t was the occurrence of numerous other incidents of which
plaintiff early on became aware which, for her, created a
sexually hostile or offensive working environment. This in
turn poisoned any possibility of plaintiff's having the proper
professional respect for her superiors and, without any ques-
tion, affected her motivation and her performance of her job
responsibilities.'
14
In support of its holding, the court made clear that the supervisors'
conduct was common knowledge around the office." 5
Not all courts have recognized a Title VII "paramour" claim in
similar circumstances; those rejecting the theory indicate that "prefer-
ential treatment on the basis of a consensual romantic relationship
between a supervisor and an employee is not gender-based discrimi-
nation. '1 6 The EEOC policy also recognizes that not all favoritism
rises to the level of sex discrimination under Title VII:
VII claim where supervisor changed requirements for promotion which benefited the woman
with whom he was romantically involved).
112 See Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1278.
113 Id. at 1280. This harassment included a supervisor approaching his administrative
assistant commenting on her "'sexy, wide hips,"' a supervisor using foul language and telling
crude jokes, a supervisor with an on-going sexual relationship with a secretary which created
controversy when the secretary received three promotions and cash awards, and a supervisor
who spent the night with his secretary in a hotel room on a business trip; the secretary subse-
quently climbed the salary rank rapidly. See id. at 1274; see also Spencer v. Gen. Elec. Co., 697
F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Va. 1988) (supporting in dictum a bystander injury claim where sexual
horseplay was welcomed by co-workers), aff'd., 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990).
..4 Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1273 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Drinkwater v. Union Carbide
Corp., 904 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that although plaintiff only showed an offensive
environment and not a severe and hostile environment, evidence of a "sufficiently oppressive
environment" could infer intentional discrimination).
1'5 See Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1275.
116 Miller v. Aluminum Co., 679 F. Supp. 495, 501 (W.D. Penn. 1988), aff'd, 856 F.2d 184
(3d Cir. 1989) (citing DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986));
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It is the Commission's position that Title VII does not pro-
hibit isolated instances of preferential treatment based upon
consensual romantic relationships. An isolated instance of
favoritism toward a "paramour" (or a spouse, or a friend)
may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against women or
men in violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged
for reasons other than their genders [sic].117
The second subset of hostile environment theory resembling the
bystander injury claim is the display of sexually explicit pictures or
cartoons in the workplace. 118 Employees who object to the posting of
materials that depict women in a subordinate or objective manner al-
lege sexual harassment under the hostile environment theory. While
courts are generally reticent to find that the display of sexual images
is sufficient to state a cause of action under Title VII, many courts
look to this conduct as evidence of a hostile work environment." 9
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, however, a federal dis-
trict court found that displaying sexually explicit or obscene pictures
is highly relevant to the hostile environment inquiry. 120 The Robinson
court concluded that these types of displays in the workplace "'may
communicate that women should be the objects of sexual aggression,
that they are submissive slaves to male desires, or that their most sali-
ent and desirable attributes are sexual.", 2' The court implicitly em-
braced the bystander injury theory in explaining that a hostile work
environment may be perceived by "other persons of a plaintiff's pro-
tected class, even if that treatment is learned second-hand."' 22 The
court rejected the Defendant's argument that because the pictures
were displayed before the plaintiff began working, there was not in-
tent to discriminate. 123 While it remains unresolved whether sexually
accord Autry v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 820 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (4th Cir.
1987).
"7 EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 44, at 405:6817.
"s See, e.g., Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 477-82 (5th Cir. 1989) (reversing
summary judgment for employer and remanding with instructions to consider evidence of sexu-
ally explicit graffiti, calendars, and "used" tampons hanging from lockers); Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1526 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that sexually explicit
material, although not intended to discriminate against observers, is relevant evidence of a hos-
tile work environment).
19 See LINDENiANN AND KADUE, supra note 46, at 217; Waltman, 875 F.2d at 477; Robin-
son, 760 F. Supp. at 1526. But cf. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir.
1986) (holding that co-workers' vulgar language, in concert with posters of naked women, did
not result in a hostile working environment).
120 760 F. Supp. at 1526.
121 Id. at 1526 (quoting Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation
of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1212 n.1 18 (1989)).
'2 Id. at 1499.
12 See id at 1523; see also Franke, supra note 22, at 721 (discussing the Robinson court's
findings).
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explicit material alone may constitute a violation of Title VII, this
form of bystander injury discrimination has long been recognized as
relevant evidence of a hostile working environment.
5. The Rejection of "Bystander Injury": Preventing Associational
Injury Claims
As indicated in Part I.E., federal courts have rejected claims that
resemble the bystander injury cause of action. The Seventh Circuit in
Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. held that white employees failed
to show evidence of a hostile environment claim for race discrimina-
tion directed at their fellow black co-workers. 124 Similarly, in Chil-
dress v. City of Richmond, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a ruling that
white male police officers did not have standing to sue under Title
VII for discrimination against female and black officers. 25 These
cases have one feature in common: the plaintiffs alleged that the in-
jury they suffered was a sort of "quasi hostile environment" shared by
the targeted victims of discrimination and the plaintiffs. The injuries,
however, are not directly caused by the harassment, but a product of
the changed social and work environment that altered the personal
and working relationships among the co-workers. For these reasons,
courts reject the claims because the plaintiffs fail to produce evidence
that they were in fact discriminated against because of their member-
ship in a class protected by Title VII.
The Leibovitz court distinguished these cases by indicating that
the plaintiffs in both Childress and Drake were outside of the pro-
tected class that was the target of the discrimination and labeled the
claims in these cases as "associational."' 126 Although the Leibovitz
court did not provide extensive analysis outlining the difference be-
tween a "bystander" claim and an "associational" claim, there is a
clear distinction between the two theories. In a bystander injury
claim, the plaintiff is not alleging injury to social and working rela-
tionships among workers. Instead, a bystander plaintiff alleges a per-
sonal injury from the discriminatory conduct and that the injury was a
result of discrimination against her as a woman, not because of a
chilling effect on the relationships between the targeted employees
and the bystander employees. Stated more concretely, Leibovitz did
not claim that she lost the associational benefits with her co-workers
who were the target of the harassment. She alleged physical and
124 134 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d
1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that white officers could not bring a Title VII claim where
supervisors disparaged women and black officers).
'2 134 F.3d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1998).
126 See Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp.2d 144, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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emotional harm personally suffered because of the hostile work envi-
ronment.
It is also apparent that the sex of the victim is of critical impor-
tance in the distinction between associational and bystander claims.
A bystander plaintiff outside of the gender class targeted by the har-
asser advances an associational claim in that the result of the harass-
ing conduct was a hostile environment due to a loss of social and
work related interaction with the victims. For example, a male by-
stander employee who alleges injury due to a hostile environment
because of discrimination directed against female co-workers will not
be able to prove discrimination "because of sex." In this situation, the
male bystander is essentially arguing the associational claim that has
been rejected by the Seventh and Fourth Circuits and not a discrimi-
nation claim based on his sex. Instead, he can only show that he lost
the associational benefits of a positive working relationship with his
female co-workers because of the discriminatory conduct against
women.
Conversely, a female bystander who alleges injury from a hostile
environment because of discriminatory conduct directed at her female
co-workers may be able to show sex discrimination because she is a
member of the class targeted by the harasser. The female bystander is
not alleging a loss of social and work association with the targeted
employees, but injury caused directly by the harassing conduct. 127
The associational-bystander distinction, then, is based on the gender
of the plaintiff and the targeted victims. The distinction may also be
viewed as differences in proving injury and causation. In a bystander
claim, the injury is a direct and proximate result of the harassing con-
duct. In the associational claim, the injury is indirectly related to the
harassing behavior and is actually tied to the way in which the tar-
geted victims treat those who are not the target of the harassing con-
duct (the target's co-workers). Therefore, the associational claims
rejected by the Seventh and Fourth Circuits can be distinguished from
the bystander claim seen in Leibovitz. Indeed, Judge Weinstein noted
that:
127 There is, of course, the possibility that the injury suffered by the bystander plaintiff may
actually be associational and not caused directly by the discriminatory conduct. For example, a
female plaintiff who was not subjected to the harassing conduct may fall into disfavor with the
targeted female employees. If the injury is a result of getting the "cold shoulder" from the tar-
geted employees because they are upset that she is not being subjected to the harassment, the
injury may be associational in nature and not sex discrimination. Therefore, the injury would
be identical to the injury suffered by the male employee who loses the associational benefits
with his female co-workers. In this scenario, the cause of action is not bystander injury as seen
in Leibovitz See supra notes 2-6, 47-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Leibovitz
case.
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[T]he jury... did not find for plaintiff on an associational
discrimination claim. Rather, it found, in effect, that having
to experience other women being harassed or knowing of the
harassment in her own workplace caused plaintiff to become
depressed, anxious, and emotionally distraught, because she
felt demeaned as a member of the harassed class.128
Therefore, the conclusions drawn from the legislative history of
the Act, the Supreme Court's expansive reading of sex discrimination
to include sexual harassment, an interrelationship between the hostile
environment and bystander injury theories, and existing indirect dis-
crimination case law strongly support a claim for bystander sexual
harassment injury under Title VII. While these conclusions establish
the statutory component of the bystander injury claim, a plaintiff must
still establish standing to sue in federal courts.
B. Bystander Injury Plaintiffs Have Standing to Sue
Parties alleging an injury and seeking redress through the federal
courts must have the requisite standing in order to bring their case
within the jurisdiction of the court. Because the bystander injury
claim raises questions whether the injury suffered may be remedied
by the federal courts, the Leibovitz court took careful steps to ensure
that the plaintiff had standing to sue.129 For these reasons, a careful
analysis of the standing issue is critical to determining whether a by-
stander to sexual harassment may bring a claim under Title VII. 3°
First, it must be noted that Congress provides the means for a
person to sue under the Act. The applicable language in Title VII
states that "a person claiming to be aggrieved" has standing to file
charges alleging discrimination in employment. 31  Under current
standing doctrine, if a statute defines the right to sue, the Supreme
Court requires a showing of "whether the ... statutory provision on
which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons
in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief."132
In considering this requirement, it is important to recognize the
breadth of the enforcement language in the Act. Title VII does not
'28 Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp.2d at 151 (emphasis added). The Leibovitz court expressly refused
to determine whether a male worker would have standing for discrimination against females co-
workers, thereby eschewing from the association analysis. See id. at 149.
'29 See id. at 148-50.
130 For a comprehensive review of the standing issue in the context of male plaintiffs al-
leging a hostile environment based on discrimination against female employees, see generally
Torrey, supra note 8.
131 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994).
132 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
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attempt to define standards to determine who is "aggrieved" under the
statute; anyone who feels they have suffered from an unlawful em-
ployment action under the language in the Act may file charges with
the EEOC or relevant State agency.133  This broad reading of the
phrase "aggrieved person" is consistent with the Third Circuit's con-
clusion in Hackett v. McGuire Bros., a Title VII race discrimination
claim where the court stated that "[t]he use.., of the language 'a per-
son claiming to be aggrieved' shows a congressional intention to de-
fine standing as broadly as is permitted by Article mT of the Constitu-
tion." 34  The Supreme Court adopted this broad approach one year
later in a racial discrimination in housing claim under Title Vm of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. 135 Although the Court's decision rested on an interpretation
of Title VIII, Trafficante explicitly approved the conclusions reached
by the Hackett court. 136  The Court articulated that the language of
Title VIII-like Title VII-is "broad and inclusive," written to cover
injuries claimed in fact from the discrimination. 137
Not all courts have followed this approach to the "aggrieved per-
son" language in the statute. In Childress v. City of Richmond,138 the
Fourth Circuit held that Title VII should not be broadly construed
because the statute does not define the term "aggrieved person.' 39
The court upheld a district court finding that a third-party plaintiff
does not have standing under Title VII when the alleged injury was a
loss of associational benefits and an unfriendly work environment.'4°
Similarly, in the context of determining the composition of the class
133 A plaintiff is required to file a charge with the EEOC or similar State agency before
receiving a "right to sue" letter, notifying the complainant of her right to file a claim in federal
court. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b) - (c) (1994).
'" 445 F.2d 442,446 (3d Cir. 1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (1964)).
,.S 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In this case, a white and black tenant claimed injury from dis-
crimination against non-white applicants in that they had "lost the social benefits of living in an
integrated community" and suffered other economic and emotional embarrassment from living
in a "white ghetto." Id. at 208.
136 See id. at 209 (citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 455 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971) to estab-
lish that "[Title VII] "is broad and inclusive"); see also Torrey, supra note 8, at 372.
117 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209.
138 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
.3 134 F.3d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1998).
140 Judge Luttig, concurring in the per curiam decision, explained that:
In notable contrast to Title VIII, Title VII does not define the term "aggrieved per-
son." Not only does the complete absence of a definition in Title VII imply that
Congress chose to incorporate the "term of art" definition of "aggrieved person,"
which... includes prudential standing limitations; but the presence of a definition of
the term in Title VIII... strongly evidences that Congress intended different mean-
ings for the term "aggrieved person" across the two statutes, further reinforcing the
conclusion that "aggrieved person" in Title VII must be interpreted to incorporate
prudential standing limitations [against third-party standing].
Childress, 134 F.3d at 1210 (Luttig, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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of plaintiffs for class action lawsuits, a handful of federal district
courts have invoked a strict reading of standing requirements by dis-
missing members outside of the racial class that were not the direct
targets of the harassment.
141
A proper application of the Supreme Court's standing rules to
the bystander injury claim finds that a bystander injury plaintiff will
easily meet the standing requirements. Although the Supreme Court
has not provided considerable analysis of the phrase "aggrieved per-
sons" under Title VII, its approval of the Third Circuit's broad ap-
proach to standing strongly indicates that a limited view of standing
for sexual harassment under Title VII is misplaced. Thus, a bystander
injury plaintiff who claims to be "aggrieved" by unlawful practices
under the Act has been given standing to sue by the broad enforce-
ment language enacted by Congress.
Notwithstanding the statute's expansive standing language, a
bystander injury plaintiff meets the traditional standing requirements
set forth by the Supreme Court. In Warth v. Seldin, the Supreme
Court set forth a two-component test for the standing analysis: a
"constitutional requirement" and a "prudential limit."' 42 The Consti-
tutional requirement finds its basis in Article III, Section 2, which
provides federal court jurisdiction only if it is a "case' or "contro-
versy," which the Supreme Court considers a "bedrock require-
ment."'143 This clause has been interpreted to require the party to
show "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-
court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial pow-
ers on his behalf."'144 The claim must also be capable of redressing
injuries to that particular plaintiff and not solely for injuries sustained
by others. This is referred to as the "prudential" limit to standing. 14
5
Here the Court states that "the plaintiff generally must assert his own
legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the
legal rights or interests of third parties.' 46  The prudential limit is
141 See, e.g., Torrey, supra note 8, at 381 n.85. Most of the claims alleged by these plain-
tiffs were "associational" injuries and are thus distinguishable from the type of claim seen in
Leibovitz. See supra text accompanying notes 2-6,47-51.
147 422 U.S. 490, 490 (1975). For a comprehensive review of the Court's recent decisions
outlining the standing requirements, see Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-19 (1997).
143 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
'44 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)); see also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992) (stating that the plaintiff must
show that "the injury [affects] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way" to invoke federal
jurisdiction).
145 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500.
'46 Id at 499.
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incorporated into legal standing provided in the Constitution or a par-
ticular federal statute by requiring the plaintiff to show "whether the
constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly
can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiffs position a
right to judicial relief."' 147
To assist in the determination of standing, the Supreme Court in
Allen v. Wright enunciated particular factors that probe the essential
elements of constitutional and prudential requirements. 14' The factors
to be considered include: "Is the injury too abstract, or otherwise not
appropriate, to be considered judicially cognizable? Is the line of
causation between the illegal conduct and injury too attenuated? Is
the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favor-
able ruling too speculative?" 149 The Allen court also indicated that
"clear rules developed in prior cases" could be used to aid in deter-
mining standing.1
50
The Leibovitz court determined that the plaintiff in the bystander
injury claim easily met the standing requirements set forth by the Su-
preme Court.151 The court, relying on expert and lay person testi-
mony, found that the plaintiff had a "distinct and actual" emotional
injury from the hostile work environment.152 Furthermore, the court
found that this injury was "directly traceable to the sexually harassing
environment in her workplace."'153 Following the Allen court's rec-
ommendation to rely on rules in previous cases, the Leibovitz court
also relied on analogous Title VII and housing discrimination case
law to establish that the prudential limit on standing is met by a by-
stander injury plaintiff.154
Moreover, a bystander plaintiff who works among targeted em-
ployees and is affected by the discriminatory conduct and attitude by
supervisors meets the required "line of causation between the illegal
conduct and injury,', 155 as long as the plaintiff is not too far removed
from the discriminatory conduct. 56 First, Title VII has long recog-
nized that sexual harassment is actionable by the victim under the
statute. Second, sexual harassment plaintiffs have recovered on indi-
rect discrimination claims analogous to the bystander injury theory;
'4' Id at 500.
'4' 468 U.S. 737,752 (1984).
149 Id. at 752.
15 Id.
'-" Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp.2d 144, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
152 See id.
153 Id. at 150.
1-4 See supra text accompanying notes 131-34.
"5 Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
156 But cf Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp.2d at 146 (noting that plaintiff did not directly observe the
harassing conduct); see also infra Part ILC.
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the line of Title VII cases involving sexual favoritism and porno-
graphic displays suggest that employees who were not necessarily the
target of discriminatory harassment may successfully state a claim
under the Act. 157 In this respect, "the prospect of obtaining relief
from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling" is not "too specula-
tive" for a bystander plaintiff.158 Accordingly, the Leibovitz decision
explained that the fact that she was not a targeted victim "does not
take her claim... outside Article ]1I.,,159 Therefore, an application of
the Supreme Court's standing rules to the bystander injury theory
finds that a bystander victim can establish the requisite elements of
standing to sue for hostile environment sex discrimination under Title
VII. 160
C Theoretical and Practical Complications of the Bystander Injury
Claim
The analysis thus far has shown that a bystander injury plaintiff
can meet both the substantive statutory and constitutional standing
requirements to state a claim for hostile environment sexual harass-
ment. The focus must now turn to the complications that arise under
this theory of discrimination and how to reconcile these complications
within the existing Title VII framework. The following issues have
the potential to severely limit bystander injury sexual harassment
claims:
1. Different Classes of Victims: Discrimination "Because of Sex"?
The sex of the bystander plaintiff vis-h-vis the sex of the in-
tended victim is critical in the determination of which employees may
state a claim for bystander injury. 161 This is because a bystander
plaintiff who cannot prove that the harassment is based on his gender
may not state a claim under Title VII. An "equal opportunity har-
asser" may not be in violation of Title VII because the harassment is
not discriminating against one particular sex.162 In these cases, "the
sexual harassment would not be based on sex because men and
1S7 See supra notes 112-16, 119-24 and accompanying text.
15 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,752 (1984).
159 Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp.2d at 148
160 There is one caveat to this conclusion: the bystander must be in the same class as the
targeted employees. See infra Part Ill. But see Torrey, supra note 8, at 380 ("[l]njury deriving
from a discriminatory work environment or a deprivation of association with protected classes
satisfies standing" regardless of the sex of the parties).
161 See supra Part ILA.4.
162 This term probably originated from Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1 1th
Cir. 1982) (explaining how conduct directed at both sexes is "equally offensive"), but was first
brought to my attention by Professor Kathleen Engel.
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women are accorded like treatment... [and] the plaintiff would have
no remedy under Title VII' 163  As targeted victims are usually the
opposite sex of the harasser in a traditional hostile environment claim,
the requirement to prove gender-based discrimination from harassing
conduct is not necessarily problematic. It is presumed that sexually-
charged harassment between a male and female is motivated by the
sex of the victim.' 64 In a bystander injury claim, however, the plain-
tiff faces the additional burden of showing that the harassing conduct,
though not directed at the plaintiff, had the same discriminatory effect
because of the plaintiff's sex.
Although Leibovitz explicitly refused to determine whether the
bystander must be in the same gender class of the targeted victims,
existing case law clearly indicates that a male bystander of female-
targeted harassment will not be able to prove discrimination "because
of sex."'165 In holding that same-sex harassment is actionable under
Title VII, the Oncale Court emphasized that the holding does not ex-
tend to harassment directed at both sexes:
We have never held that workplace harassment, even har-
assment between men and women, is automatically discrimi-
nation because of sex merely because the words used have
sexual content or connotations. "The critical issue, Title
VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are ex-
'6 Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. But see Kimberly McCreight, Comment, Call for Consis-
tency: Title VII and Same-Sex Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. &
Emp. L 269, 293 (1998) (arguing that consistency in Title VII jurisprudence demands that
courts should not look to the gender of the harasser and the victims; instead, the dispositive
question must rest "on the sexual content and extremity of the harassment").
164 See Oncale v. Sundowner Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (noting that the chain of infer-
ences is easily drawn in the traditional male-female claim and in homosexual same-sex harass-
ment); see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 ("[P]laintiff must show that but for the fact of her sex,
she would not have been the object of harassment.") (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,
942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
165 The court stated that:
[There may be a legal difference between a male alleging that he is losing the asso-
ciational benefits of female colleagues in the work environment because women
were leaving due to harassment, and a woman alleging that the work environment
was hostile to her personally because she was working in an environment where
other women were being demoralized and abused on the basis of their gender. This
further step in the law is not required to support plaintiffs claims ....
Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp.2d 144, 151-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). This
point, of course, is arguable. Leibovitz's attorney, Professor Merrick Rossein, argues that a man
would have standing in a bystander injury suit involving women: "There's an injury in fact,
because it's troublesome to a male worker to be in an environment where co-workers are being
sexually harassed." Allison B. Bianchi, Employee Collects $60,000 Because Other Women Were
Sexually Harassed, LAW. WKLY. USA. June 15, 1998, at 21.
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posed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment
to which members of the other sex are not exposed."
Read in the context of bystander injury, the Court's reasoning clearly
indicates that an alleged harasser who targets discriminatory conduct
toward female employees cannot, afortiori, be discriminating against
male employees. Additionally, Justice Thomas' concurring opinion
in Oncale--consisting of a curious one sentence statement-empha-
sizes that "in every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must plead
and ultimately prove Title VI's statutory requirement that there be
discrimination 'because of ... sex."' 167 Therefore, only those em-
ployees who are the same sex as the targeted victim may state a claim
of bystander injury sexual harassment. 168
2. Proximity to the Harassing Conduct
Although the Leibovitz court did not explicitly discuss the im-
portance of the relationship between the bystander's work environ-
ment and the targeted victim's work environment, proximity matters
in a bystander injury claim.169 A bystander who only hears of sexual
'66 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 12, 25 (1993) (Gins-
burg, J. concurring)).
,67 Id. at 82.
168 This matrix represents the implications of this requirement:
Harasser Targeted Victim Bystander Victim Result
Male Female Female Actionable
Male Male Male Actionable
Male Female Male Not Actionable
Male Male Female Not Actionable
Female Male Male Actionable
Female Female Female Actionable
Female Male Female Not Actionable
Female Female Female Not Actionable
169 In common law torts, proximity is crucial in determining liability for emotional distress
suffered by a bystander. The common law "impact" rule disallowed recovery for emotional
distress unless the victim was physically impacted. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354
(N.Y. 1896) (holding no recovery for fright without impact from horses corralled around preg-
nant woman). As the common law progressed, states adopted more lenient rules for recovery.
One such rule, the "zone of danger" test, was first adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and
required the plaintiff to be within the zone of proximity where physical injury may have oc-
curred. See Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 498-99 (Wis. 1935). In 1968, the California
Supreme Court abrogated the zone of danger rule with a list of factors to determine the degree
of forseeability that injury would occur, thereby eliminating the requirement that the plaintiff be
in the path of the harm. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919-20 (Cal. 1968); Howard H. Kes-
tin, The Bystander's Cause of Action for Emotional Injury: Reflections on the Relational Eligi-
bility Standard, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 512, 516-18 (1996). In 1989, the California Supreme
Court established a bright-line rule in the absence of impact, requiring the plaintiff to be (1)
closely related to the victim; (2) present at the scene of the accident and aware of the injury to
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harassment in the workplace will have a much more difficult task in
showing injury from "severe" or "pervasive" harassment than one
who works closely with the targeted employee or under the direction
of the alleged harasser. 170  These issues were first addressed by the
California Court of Appeal in Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospi-
tal.17 1 In concluding that an employee does not have to be the target
of sexual harassment to be a victim of a hostile work environment, the
court stated that:
Given the ease with which these claims can be made despite
their serious nature, as a matter of fairness, a plaintiff should
be required to plead sufficient facts to establish a nexus be-
tween the alleged sexual harassment of others, her observa-
tion of that conduct and the work context in which it oc-
curred. 172
The Fisher formulation, then, requires a plaintiff to "establish that she
personally witnessed the harassing conduct and that it was in her im-
mediate work environment."' 73 The court seemed to have enunciated
a standard that would reject a bystander injury claim unless the plain-
tiff could show that the harassing conduct was viewed first-hand and
permeated the plaintiff's direct work environment. 174
the victim; (3) suffers severe emotional distress "beyond that which would be anticipated in a
disinterested witness." Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989).
While it may be apparent that few, if any, bystander sexual harassment victims could claim
emotional distress under these rules, a traditional torts analysis is unnecessary and improper.
See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also Christopher P. Barton, Note, Between the Boss and
a Hard Place: A Consideration of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson and the Law of Sexual
Harassment, 67 B.U. L. REV. 445, 464 (1987) (arguing that Title VII abrogates reliance on
traditional tort theories for recovery from sexual harassment). Therefore, this Note is not con-
strained by these rules and does not examine them further in light of the proximity issue.
170 But c Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp.2d at 146 (stating that "much of the alleged harassment did
not occur in plaintiff's immediate vicinity and much of what she knew about the situation was
second- or third-hand").
171 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
172 Id. at 854-55. The Plaintiff, a nurse, alleged that a doctor-supervisor engaged in con-
duct that included:
pulling nurses onto his lap, hugging and kissing them while wiggling, making offen-
sive statements of a sexual nature, moving his hands in the direction of [a] woman's
vaginal area, grabbing women from the back with his hands on their breasts or in the
area of their breasts, picking up women and swinging them around, throwing a
woman on a gurney, walking up closely behind a woman with movements of his
pelvic area. [Ms. Fisher] saw him commit acts of sexual harassment against [three
named] nurses. The acts were committed in hallways, the operating room, and the
lunch room.., from 1982 to 1986.
Id. at 854.
171 Id. at 853.
174 See id. Applying the Fisher court's rule, it is clear why the court dismissed a portion of
the Plaintiffs complaint. Although the acts were sufficient to defeat summary judgment, Fisher
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In 1998, the California Court of Appeals revisited these issues in
Beyda v. City of Los Angeles.175 In Beyda, the court followed the ra-
tionale in Fisher, but stated that "[t]o the degree that Fisher may be
understood to require that a plaintiff personally witness any act relied
upon to prove hostile environment, we respectfully disagree.' '176 The
court posited that an employee may be injured by a hostile work envi-
roment simply with the knowledge that other employees have been
the targets of the harassment. The court intimated that a plaintiff with
personal knowledge (as opposed to personal observation) of the har-
assment can establish the requisite nexus between the alleged conduct
and injury. 177
The Leibovitz court's failure to focus on the proximity issue is a
significant weakness in the analysis of the bystander injury claim.178
Under the Fisher formulation, Leibovitz's complaint would probably
fail to state a claim because she did not directly observe the harassing
conduct. 179 Instead of addressing the potential problem created by a
plaintiff who is far removed from the harassing conduct, the court
instead draws upon the analogy of "a rare Jewish person in a Nazi
concentration camp afforded privileged treatment while other Jews
were being horribly persecuted." 180  While the court admits the con-
ditions are nowhere comparable to death camps, it states that "[t]he
deterioration of the humanity, spirit, and dignity of a member of an
abused class, granted personal immunity on her promise that she will
did not specifically allege how the conduct affected her direct working environment. See id. at
854.
17- 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
176 Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
"n See id.
,78 The decision simply points to the evidence of "widespread gender-based harassment"
which was repeatedly told to the plaintiff by other women. Leibovitz v. New York City Trans.
Auth., 4 F. Supp.2d 144, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
'79 To the extent the Fisher court requires personal observation of the harassment, Leibo-
vitz's claim would fail. While the Leibovitz complaint alleged specific injury from the harass-
ment and that Leibovitz complained to management and was warned that her job may be in
jeopardy if she continued to pursue the matter, she did not personally observe the harassing
conduct. See id. at 146-47.
1SO Id. at 152. To complete the analogy, the court also quoted a compelling excerpt from a
book on the Nazi camps:
The ocean of pain, past and present, surrounded us, and its level rose from year to
year until it almost submerged us. It was useless to close one's eyes or turn one's
back to it because it was all around, in every direction, all the way to the horizon. It
was not possible for us nor did we want to become islands; the just among us, nei-
ther more nor less numerous than in any other human group, felt remorse, shame,
and pain for the misdeeds that others and not they had committed, and in which they
felt involved, because they sensed that what had happened around them and in their
presence, and in them, was irrevocable .... It is enough not to see, not to listen, not
to act.
Id. (quoting PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 86 (Raymond Rosenthal trans.,
Summit Books Ed.) (1988)).
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remain silent-perhaps even that she will turn away and not see what
is plain to see-is impermissible under fundamental ethics and
law." 181
While the court's analogy to Nazi death camps is powerful, it
does not adequately address situations where the connection between
the bystander employee and the harassing conduct is so weak that it
may be unreasonable to conclude that a plaintiff suffered from severe
or pervasive harassment.18 2 For example, an employee who works on
a different floor or section of a large building may not have been ex-
posed to the level of discriminatory harassment Title VII intended to
proscribe. In these cases, the courts will be faced with the task of
determining the level of the harassment and the scope of its effect on
the terms or conditions of employment. This may be especially trou-
bling in close cases where the harassment occurred outside of the
plaintiff's immediate work area, yet was common knowledge to em-
ployees and the plaintiff.
The rule in Fisher, however, is overly strict and unnecessarily
excludes plaintiffs like Leibovitz who have not personally observed
the harassing conduct but are close enough for the harassment to af-
fect the terms and conditions of her employment. There are many
ways an employee may perceive workplace discrimination besides the
actual observation of harassment. 83 The Oncale court's emphasis on
the importance of the context of harassment in same-sex cases is use-
ful in answering the proximity problem in a bystander injury claim.
The Oncale court stated that "[t]he real social impact of workplace
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circum-
stances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured
by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts per-
formed."'184 An understanding of the complexities of the workplace-
the varying degree of social interaction in the work environment-
strongly suggests that sexual harassment can be so severe or
pervasive that it substantially alters working conditions even if an
employee does not personally observe actual conduct.1 85 To conclude
that work environments are so individualistic and insulated that
181 Id.
""2 This analogy may also lead to significant unfairness to the employer who makes rea-
sonable attempts to correct sexual harassment. See infra Part M.D.
18 See, e.g., Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(stating that "personal observation is not the only way that a person can perceive, and be af-
fected by, harassing conduct in the workplace").
184 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998). The Court identifies
the distinction between the coach swatting a football player on the buttocks in the middle of a
game and smacking his secretary (male or female) in the office. See id.
'" For example, a plaintiff with frequent contact with the targeted employees and under
the supervision of the harasser may well be affected by the harassment even if the actual physi-
cal proximity to the other employees is not close.
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environments are so individualistic and insulated that harassment can
only be severe or pervasive when it is personally observed is to com-
pletely misapprehend the true nature of the workplace.
Instead of the strict formulation applied in Fisher, courts should
use California's Beyda rule in concert with the factors established by
the Oncale court.18 6  In analyzing the proximity question, courts
should inquire whether the "surrounding circumstances, expectations,
and relationships" reveal conduct which creates a hostile working
environment for those employees with personal observation or
knowledge of the discriminatory behavior within the surrounding
work environment. 187 This may be true even if the affected employ-
ees do not work in the same area of the targeted victim, yet have fre-
quent contact with the alleged harasser or victim. The proximity re-
quirement, in this sense, includes both social and job-related interac-
tion in employment; physical proximity to the conduct is not neces-
sarily dispositive. A contrary position leads to absurd results; when
the Fisher formulation is taken to the extreme, if a plaintiff is required
to personally observe the harassing conduct, employees who are
aware of a supervisor raping employees behind his office door may
not state a claim under Title VII.
There is, however, a limit to the Beyda formulation of proximity.
Not all knowledge of sexual harassment in the workplace can rise to a
level of a hostile work environment. The court, then, is faced with
determining both the extent and the substance of the knowledge, in
addition to other relevant circumstances. As the Beyda court properly
warns, "mere workplace gossip" is not sufficient to show proof of
injury. 188
3. The Targeted Employee Welcomes the Harassing Conduct
The final complication in the bystander injury claim is whether a
bystander who does not welcome the sexual harassment may state a
claim when the targeted employee welcomes the conduct. Courts
may be tempted to summarily conclude that because the targeted em-
ployee welcomed the conduct, a bystander could not have suffered
injury. A dismissal on this ground would be erroneous, because the
dispositive question has always been whether the plaintiff welcomed
8 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82; Beyda, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
'87 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
' See Beyda, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552. It should be noted that in the Leibovitz case, the
plaintiff did not rely solely on gossip. Leibovitz confronted the harasser and her supervisors,
demanding that the conduct be stopped. The Transit Authority did not quickly respond to her
complaints and one supervisor advised her that her complaints could hurt her career at the
Authority. See Leibovitz v. New York Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp.2d 144, 146-47 (E.D.N.Y.
1998).
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the harassment, not whether the target or other co-workers welcomed
or returned the harassing conduct.
The Supreme Court case law and the existence of successful
claims by third party plaintiffs under the sexual favoritism theory
(where some women have welcomed the conduct to gain favor in the
workplace) supports the conclusion that harassment does not have to
be unwelcome by all employees for a plaintiff to state a claim under
Title VII. 189 The EEOC policy statement on sexual harassment also
lends considerable support: "Even if the targets of the humor 'play
along' and in no way display that they object, co-workers of any race,
national origin or sex can claim that this conduct, which communi-
cates a bias against protected class members, creates a hostile work
environment for them." 190  Moreover, the Act itself prohibits dis-
crimination against an employee "because he has opposed any prac-
tice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter" and
provides for a retaliation claim. 191 This provision protects employees
even if other employees welcome the conduct and even if the com-
plaining employee wrongly concludes that conduct is unlawful.192
Therefore, a bystander employee whose terms and conditions of em-
ployment are affected by severe or pervasive discriminatory conduct
may successfully state a claim under Title VII, regardless of whether
the targeted employees welcomed the conduct.
H. AFTER LEIBOvITZ: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE BYSTANDER INJURY
HARASSMENT CLAIM
As the Leibovitz decision and the preceding analysis indicate, the
bystander injury theory-while still in its infancy-has the potential
to become a powerful new tool in Title VII sexual harassment litiga-
tion. The plaintiffs success in the Leibovitz case will likely have a
profound effect on the way plaintiffs' attorneys approach sexual har-
assment claims. With the potential for more bystander injury claims
comes substantial concern over how courts should analyze a plain-
tiff's claim. Based on the preceding analysis of the Act, relevant case
law, and EEOC guidelines, the federal courts should consider the
189 See, e.g., Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D. D.C. 1988) (stating that
"Title VII is also violated when an employer affords preferential treatment to female employees
who submit to sexual advances or other conduct of a sexual nature and such conduct is a matter
of common knowledge").
19o EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 44, at 405:6820.
'9' 42U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
192 See, e.g., Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge if he has a
reasonable belief that the employer was violating Title VID.
19991
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
following framework in determining whether a plaintiff may state a
claim for bystander injury under Title VII.
A. Utilize Existing Hostile Environment Burdens of Proof
Because the bystander injury claim can be viewed as a subset to
the traditional hostile environment claims under Meritor, Harris, El-
lerth, and Oncale, courts should treat a claim of bystander injury in
the same manner as a traditional sexual harassment claim. As with
the traditional claims, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the conduct
was unwelcome; 193 (2) the conduct was subjectively unreasonable and
so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and
create an abusive work environment; 194 and (3) that the discrimination
was because of sex. 195 There is no readily-identifiable reason why the
existing sexual harassment paradigm will not further the goals of Title
VII in a bystander injury claim.
B. Dismiss Claims Involving Victims of Different Gender
A bystander injury plaintiff that is not the same sex of the tar-
geted victim cannot prove sex discrimination and thus may not state a
claim under the bystander injury theory. In rejecting an opposite-sex
bystander claim, the court properly distinguishes between an "asso-
ciational" injury and a "sex discrimination" claim. A bystander who
is only offended at the treatment of co-workers or suffers from lost
friendship with the co-workers has not been personally discriminated
against because of sex. Title VII was not intended to create friendly
work environments, only to prevent and correct sex-based discrimi-
nation.
Courts should be aware, however, that this rejection of an oppo-
site-sex bystander injury claim is not a rejection of same-sex claims
involving the harasser and the bystander victim. As the Supreme
Court recently proclaimed in Oncale, Title VII does not preclude a
claim of same-sex harassment. 196 Therefore, as long as the bystander
plaintiff can show that the discriminatory conduct was effectuated
because of the plaintiffs sex, a plaintiff who is outside the gender
193 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17,21-22 (1993).
194 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
19S Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67; see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (stating that a plaintiff in a sexual harassment suit "must always
prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but
actually constituted 'discrimination... because of... sex"').
t9 See supra text accompanying note 36.
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class of the targeted victims may state a claim under bystander in-
jury. 1
9 7
C. Evaluate Plaintiff's Proximity to the Harassing Conduct when
Determining Injury
Courts should also pay close attention to the proximity between
the conduct and the bystander victim, keeping in mind that a plaintiff
must always prove that harassing conduct was subjectively unreason-
able and severe or pervasive, altering the conditions of employ-
ment.' 98 Courts must be wary of claims by employees who work in
different departments of a workplace if the contact between the in-
volved parties is minimal or non-existent. 9 9 This query is especially
fact-sensitive because a plaintiff that does not personally observe the
harassment but has knowledge of the conduct may establish that the
harassment is part and parcel of an overall corporate environment of
sex discrimination. Furthermore, the number and scope of the con-
tacts between the parties may be significant notwithstanding the ac-
tual physical arrangement of the workplace. A workplace environ-
ment where employees have considerable freedom to move about and
discuss personal or work-related issues may be sufficient to establish
this element of the claim, even if the harasser and the targeted and
bystander victims generally work in different areas of the office.
Related to the proximity issue is the determination of injury.
The bystander plaintiff must allege an injury that is "distinct and pal-
pable" to warrant a court remedy.2 0 Expert witnesses will undoubt-
edly play a role in determining the plaintiff's injury and while psy-
chological injury may be present, it is not required to state a claim
under Title VII.201 Courts should keep in mind, however, that any
injury alleged by the plaintiff must be a result of sex discrimination,
and not merely an "associational injury" or empathy for the targeted
employees.
197 See supra note 171.
,18 SeeHarris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
199 Courts should also bear in mind that a bystander plaintiff may only have contact with
the targeted victims and not with the alleged harasser. Although this may bear on whether the
plaintiff can meet the burden of proof on injury, it should not be viewed as a bar to a Title VII
claim.
200 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,501 (1975); see also supra Part M.B.
201 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (stating that "[slo long as the environment would reasonably
be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive... there is no need for it also to be psy-
chologically injurious") (citation omitted).
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D. Preventing, Correcting, and Containing the Hostile Environment:
New Concerns for Employers
Mention the words "sexual harassment" and "bystander victims"
to employers and watch their faces cringe. The prospect of adding
another component to the already confusing and rapidly-changing
sexual harassment law leaves many employers wondering what, if
anything, they can do to prevent and effectively handle discriminatory
conduct in the workplace. Because one of the primary purposes of
Title VII was to prevent as well as remedy discrimination in the
workplace, it is important to explore how employers should respond
to situations that may culminate in a bystander injury claim. Whole-
sale changes to employer prevention and correction plans are not nec-
essary. Employers must simply refine their methods to take bystander
injury harassment into account. The relatively minor changes neces-
sary to prevent and correct bystander injury are due to the close rela-
tionship between bystander injury and existing hostile environment
law.
First, it is important to recognize the impact of the recent Su-
preme Court decisions in Ellerth and Faragher.°2 Employers must
be cognizant of the elements and availability of the affirmative de-
fense to liability in cases involving supervisor harassment that does
not result in a tangible employment action. Employers must ensure
that they "exercise[] reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior." 20 3 At a minimum, this means em-
ployers must prevent all potentially discriminatory conduct by its su-
pervisors and employees, including overt harassment, supervisor-
employee sexual relationships, sexually-explicit pictures or graffiti,
and now, bystander injury harassment. In order to effectuate preven-
202 See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
203 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (emphasis added). The Court,
however, does not provide insight into determining the reasonableness standard in this context.
The Ninth Circuit, in Ellison v. Brady, suggested that "reasonableness of an employer's remedy
will depend on its ability to stop harassment by the person who engaged in harassment. In
evaluating the adequacy of the remedy, the court may also take into account the remedy's ability
to persuade potential harassers to refrain from unlawful conduct." 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir.
1991) (footnote omitted).
Ironically, the City of Boca Raton is again under scrutiny for its response to allegations
of sexual harassment. The Palm Beach Post reports that the city's human resources and fire
department officials failed to investigate allegations that a city paramedic was date-raping
women he met while on-duty. See Matt Mossman, Boca under fire for inattention to claims of
sex harassment, THE PALM BEACH POST, March 8, 1999, at B1. The officials apparently issued
a verbal reprimand and planned to "keep a closer watch on him." Interestingly, the officials felt
that if the accusations were true, the victim should contact the police to resolve the problem. Id.
at B1. The assistant fire chief allegedly told a firefighter who relayed allegations from a victim
that, "[ilf she's going to press criminal charges let her call the police but, you know, don't even
bother." Id.
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tion, the employer must take reasonable steps such as implementing a
clear non-discrimination employment policy and distributing the pol-
icy on the employee's first day at work. This policy must strongly
forbid all forms of harassing conduct. 204  As of this writing, many
employers are scrambling to ensure they have a policy in place-dis-
tributed to all employees-that provides an effective means for em-
ployees to report questionable conduct.20 5 The employer should also
institute an on-going review of the harassment policy through semi-
nars, informational postings or memoranda, or performance review
meetings. °6
Management must also be positively concerned with correcting
the harassing conduct once the employer is aware of the harassment
or receives a complaint from an employee. This stage is likely the
most significant change the bystander injury claim brings to the proc-
ess by which employers deal with discriminatory conduct. When an
employee approaches the employer with a complaint of harassment,
the employer must use considerable caution in pursuing the proper
course to handle the complaint.20 7 An employer can no longer deal
with only the complainant and the alleged harasser. The employer
must consider the effect the conduct has on the workplace as a whole.
This means that the more traditional response to complaints (dealing
directly with the complainant to see what he or she feels is necessary
to correct the problem) is insufficient. The employer must reach out
to other employees, especially those employees who work closely
with the complainant, to determine if the alleged conduct has affected
204 See MIKE DEBLIEUX, STOPPING SEXUAL HARASSMENT BEFORE IT STARTS: A
BUSINESs AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 76 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that employers should "[s]end a
strong message to every employee that sexual harassment is unacceptable"); see also ANNE C.
LEVY & MICHELE A. PALUDI, WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 74-83 (1997) (discussing the
key elements for an effective anti-sexual harassment polity including expressing strong disap-
proval of any such behavior); Wayne T. McGaw, Investigating Sexual Harassment: A Practical
Primer for the Corporate Lawyer, 40 LOY. L. REV. 97, 104 (1994) (proposing sample anti-
sexual harassment policy prohibiting "sexual harassment of the employee in any form").
205 The emphasis on "effective" is critical; a sexual harassment policy that is not consis-
tently enforced or provides a very narrow means of reporting harassment may not be sufficient
to raise the affirmative defense. For example, a woman who is being harassed by the supervisor
in charge of handling harassment complaints does not have a reasonable opportunity to report
the conduct. The company should ensure that multiple reporting avenues are available to em-
ployees. See, e.g., DEBLIEUX, supra note 204, at 93 (noting that an "effective... policy gives
employees options for reporting their problems or concerns" and includes both men and
women); JOSEPH M. PELLICCIOTl, TITLE VII LIABILrrY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE 78-79 (3d ed. 1996) (explaining the need for a "meaningful grievance procedure"
to meet the objective of "foster[ing] reporting"); see also LEVY & PALUDI, supra note 204, at 94
(recommending that employers establish a "team of investigators - both a woman and a man").
206 See DEBLIEUX, supra note 204, at 79-81.
207 For a comprehensive summary of an effective complaint procedure, see LEvY &
PALUDI, supra note 204, at 112-13; see also DONALD H. WEISS, FAIR, SQUARE, & LEGAL 182-
84 (rev. ed. 1995).
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the targeted victim's co-workers. During the initial stages of the
complaint, the employer may ask both the complainant and the al-
leged harasser if there are any witnesses to the conduct.2 8 In addition
to their usefulness in the traditional investigation, these employees are
a wise starting point for determining potential bystander injury vic-
tims.
The employer, in handling the complaint, should not take any
significant action without first consulting the targeted victims. A
brash decision to move the victims out of the department may errone-
ously signal to employees that they are being treated differently be-
cause of their sex or in retaliation for reporting or opposing the dis-
criminatory conduct. 209 While it may ultimately be in the best interest
to change the structure of the work environment to eliminate the har-
assment, it should be done with utmost care and clear communication
with the affected employees. Moreover, both targeted and bystander
victims should always be asked how they feel the situation should be
handled.210 Furthermore, a thorough documentation of the employees
consulted and management's response is vital to show that the em-
ployer made a concerted effort to promptly correct the existing har-
assment and prevent a future reoccurrence.1
This alteration in handling complaints as a result of the bystander
claim also brings additional concerns with respect to the alleged har-
asser. Prior to the recognition of a bystander claim, employers were
cautioned to consider the rights of the alleged perpetrator during the
investigation and handling of a complaint.1 2 An employer who
summarily discharges an alleged discriminator or engages in a pattern
of activity that is defamatory in nature may face a lawsuit by the al-
leged harasser.213 This problem is epitomized by the widely-reported
case involving the wrongful discharge claim brought by an executive
at the Miller Brewing Company in Wisconsin. The fired executive
was awarded $26.6 million in damages from his summary dismissal
208 See JuLm M. TAMMm'EN, SExuAL HARASSMENT iN THE WORKPLACE 22-24 (Supp.
1996).
209 See LEVY & PALUDI, supra note 204, at 83.
210 In some cases, victims are simply looking for an apology and a promise it will not
reoccur in the future. This open communication not only assists the investigator with deter-
mining the appropriate response, but may also provide additional protection from employee
lawsuits by providing evidence of the reasonableness of the employer's prevention and correc-
tion of harassing conduct.
211 See TAMMqNEN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT iN THE WORKPLAcE 145-47 (1994).
212 See PELLICCIOTrI, supra note 205, at 81.
213 See, e.g., Babb v. Minder, 806 F.2d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that manager
"acted with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the defamatory statements"). But cf.
Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc. 948 P.2d 412, 422 (Cal. 1998) (holding that employer
must have reasonable grounds for believing that the misconduct occurred and otherwise act
fairly).
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based on a co-worker's sexual harassment claim that was subse-
quently dismissed.214
With the rise of the bystander injury theory, this scenario raises
substantial concerns for the employer who attempts to effectively deal
with harassment complaints. Because the employer will be faced
with interviewing employees other than the targeted victim and
known witnesses, there is an increased risk that the dissemination of
allegations about the alleged harasser may become defamatory. It is
important that employers stress the confidentiality of the matter in the
early stages of the investigation and minimize the amount of infor-
mation made available to the employees interviewed to prevent defa-
mation claims brought by alleged harassers. 5 To uncover potential
bystander injury, it may be preferable for employers to conceal the
name of the complainant and the harasser in the early stages of the
investigation and instead probe with more generality to determine the
effect of the alleged conduct on the complainant's co-workers. This
can be accomplished by first interviewing co-workers within the im-
mediate work area of the complainant to determine the extent of the
damage. All of these interviews should, of course, be documented.216
E. Bystander Injury Theory and the Future of Title VII Sexual
Harassment Litigation
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas recently remarked that,
in light of the Supreme Court's Title VII decisions in 1998, "[tlhere
will be more and more litigation to clarify applicable legal rules in an
area in which both practitioners and the courts have long been beg-
ging for guidance."2 17  If this prediction proves true, these changes
will present a significant burden on government agencies and courts,
as well as raising the cost of legal expenses for business in the pre-
vention and handling of bystander injury claims.
214 See Schultz, supra note 77, at 1790-91. The case is more popularly recognized as the
"Seinfeldjoke firing" where the Miller executive, Jerold Mackenzie, was fired for describing an
episode of the TV sitcom Seinfeld to co-worker Patricia Best. The episode consisted of the
show's protagonist, Jerry Seinfeld, attempting to remember the name of the woman he is dating,
which rhymes with a part of the female anatomy. After wrongly guessing "Gipple" and
"Mulva," Seinfeld suddenly remembers it was "Delores." After Best professed her ignorance of
the punch line, Mackenzie photocopied the definition of "clitoris" from a dictionary and handed
it to her. After Best's sexual harassment lawsuit was thrown out, Mackenzie collected $26.6
million in damages from the Miller Brewing Company for wrongful discharge. See id.
215 At some point during the investigation, the employer will have to reveal the names of
the complainant and the alleged harasser to interview witnesses and potential bystander victims.
The goal is to stress to the complainant and alleged harasser that information will only be dis-
closed on a "need to know" basis. See TAMINhEN, supra note 211, at 23.
216 See ii
217 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 774 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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It is not so plainly obvious, however, that increased recognition
of the bystander injury claim discussed herein will result in substan-
tially more litigation under Title VII. First, the existence of other
third-party claims based on sexual favoritism and obscene pictures
has not resulted in a flurry of litigation in those areas. While it is true
that courts may be faced with both frivolous and non-frivolous claims
of bystander injuries, its close relationship to existing hostile envi-
ronment theory suggests that the actual number of employees willing
to pursue a claim will probably not increase dramatically. There is
one factor that may prove this prediction false: until courts establish
the definitive limits to the scope of bystander injury as this Note rec-
ommends, the potential for litigation is great. As one defense attor-
ney predicts, recognizing the bystander injury claim "could turn a
single act of sexual harassment into a huge class action and [it's un-
clear] how an employer could protect itself."218 If courts use the pro-
posed framework for analyzing bystander claims and employers
amend their procedures for preventing and correcting harassment to
account for potential bystander victims, this argument seems greatly
exaggerated.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is overwhelming legal support for the bystander injury
theory. The Supreme Court's recognition of the hostile work envi-
ronment claim in the Meitor, Harris, and Oncale decisions implicitly
recognizes a bystander injury claim under Title VII. With the advent
of the bystander injury theory, employers are now faced with the re-
alization that when the air is poisoned with sexual harassment, it can
travel quickly throughout the office infecting co-workers not intended
to be the target of the harassment. In a hostile work environment,
there are potentially many victims of sex discrimination; the by-
stander injury theory formally recognizes that co-workers that are
indirectly subjected to severe or pervasive sexual harassment may
suffer the same injuries as the targeted victims.
It is important to emphasize, however, that employer liability for
bystander injury is not unlimited. As with all Title VII claims, the
employee must still prove that the discrimination was based on their
sex. Bystander employees that are not the same gender as targeted
employees are not able to prove sex discrimination under the by-
stander injury theory. The statutory limitations and the proximity-to-
harassment requirement will preclude many employees from bringing
a successful claim under the bystander injury theory. Furthermore,
218 Bianchi, supra note 168.
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because the bystander injury theory is closely aligned to traditional
hostile environment claims, employers can effectively prevent by-
stander injury liability.
For these reasons, the sexual harassment claim brought by Diane
Leibovitz is "unusual" only in that she held her employer accountable
for her injuries from the hostile work environment.219 As more by-
stander victims bring meritorious claims against their employers, the
bystander injury sexual harassment theory may one day be as com-
monplace as the traditional hostile environment theory the Supreme
Court embraced in the Meitor decision.
CHRISTOPHER M. O'CONNORt
219 See Brief of Respondent Mechelle Vinson, supra note 1, at 44-45.
1 With appreciation to Professor James W. McElhaney for his early guidance that uncov-
ered the topic for this Note, and to Professors Kathleen Engel and Jonathan Gordon, who pro-
vided invaluable feedback throughout the research and writing process.
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